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ABSTRACT
As Machine Learning (ML) gets applied to security-critical or sensitive domains, there is a
growing need for integrity and privacy for outsourced ML computations. A pragmatic solution
comes from Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs), which use hardware and software
protections to isolate sensitive computations from the untrusted software stack. However, these
isolation guarantees come at a price in performance, compared to untrusted alternatives. This
paper initiates the study of high performance execution of Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) in
TEEs by efficiently partitioning DNN computations between trusted and untrusted devices.
Building upon an efficient outsourcing scheme for matrix multiplication, we propose Slalom, a
framework that securely delegates execution of all linear layers in a DNN from a TEE (e.g.,
Intel SGX or Sanctum) to a faster, yet untrusted, co-located processor. We evaluate Slalom by
running DNNs in an Intel SGX enclave, which selectively delegates work to an untrusted GPU.
For canonical DNNs (VGG16, MobileNet and ResNet variants) we obtain 6× to 20× increases
in throughput for verifiable inference, and 4× to 11× for verifiable and private inference.
1 INTRODUCTION
Machine learning is increasingly used in sensitive decision making and security-critical settings. At the same time,
the growth in both cloud offerings and software stack complexity widens the attack surface for ML applications.
This raises the question of integrity and privacy guarantees for ML computations in untrusted environments, in
particular for ML tasks outsourced by a client to a remote server. Prominent examples include cloud-based ML
APIs (e.g., a speech-to-text application that consumes user-provided data) or general ML-as-a-Service platforms.
Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs), e.g, Intel SGX (McKeen et al., 2013), ARM TrustZone (Alves & Felton,
2004) or Sanctum (Costan et al., 2016) offer a pragmatic solution to this problem. TEEs use hardware and software
protections to isolate sensitive code from other applications, while attesting to its correct execution. Running
outsourced ML computations in TEEs provides remote clients with strong privacy and integrity guarantees.
For outsourced ML computations, TEEs outperform pure cryptographic approaches (e.g, (Gilad-Bachrach et al.,
2016; Mohassel & Zhang, 2017; Ghodsi et al., 2017; Juvekar et al., 2018)) by multiple orders of magnitude. At
the same time, the isolation guarantees of TEEs still come at a steep price in performance, compared to untrusted
alternatives (i.e., running ML models on contemporary hardware with no security guarantees). For instance,
Intel SGX (Intel Corp., 2015) incurs significant overhead for memory intensive tasks (Orenbach et al., 2017;
Harnik & Tsfadia, 2017), has difficulties exploiting multi-threading, and is currently limited to desktop CPUs
that are outmatched by untrusted alternatives (e.g., GPUs or server CPUs). Thus, our thesis is that for modern ML
workloads, TEEs will be at least an order of magnitude less efficient than the best available untrusted hardware.
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This leads us to the main question of this paper: How can we most efficiently leverage TEEs for secure machine
learning? This was posed by Stoica et al. (2017) as one of nine open research problems for system challenges
in AI. A specific challenge they raised is that of appropriately splitting ML computations between trusted and
untrusted components, to increase efficiency as well as security by minimizing the Trusted Computing Base.
This paper explores a novel approach to this challenge, wherein a Deep Neural Network (DNN) execution
is partially outsourced from a TEE to a co-located, untrusted but faster device. Our approach, inspired by
the verifiable ASICs of Wahby et al. (2016), differs from cryptographic ML outsourcing. In our case, work
is delegated between two co-located parties, thus allowing for highly interactive—yet conceptually simpler—
outsourcing protocols with orders-of-magnitude better efficiency. Our work also departs from prior systems that
execute DNNs fully in a TEE (Ohrimenko et al., 2016; Hunt et al., 2018; Cheng et al., 2018; Hanzlik et al., 2018).
The main observation that guides our approach is that matrix multiplication—the main bottleneck in DNNs—
admits a concretely efficient verifiable outsourcing scheme known as Freivalds’ algorithm (Freivalds, 1977),
which can also be turned private in our setting. Our TEE selectively outsources these CPU intensive steps to a
fast untrusted co-processor (and runs the remaining steps itself) therefore achieving much better performance
than running the entire computation in the enclave, without compromising security.
Contributions. We propose Slalom, a framework for efficient DNN inference in any trusted execution environ-
ment (e.g., SGX or Sanctum). To evaluate Slalom, we build a lightweight DNN library for Intel SGX, which
may be of independent interest. Our library allows for outsourcing all linear layers to an untrusted GPU without
compromising integrity or privacy. Our code is available at https://github.com/ftramer/slalom.
We formally prove Slalom’s security, and evaluate it on multiple canonical DNNs with a variety of computational
costs—VGG16 (Simonyan & Zisserman, 2014), MobileNet (Howard et al., 2017), and ResNets (He et al.,
2016). Compared to running all computations in SGX, outsourcing linear layers to an untrusted GPU increases
throughput (as well as energy efficiency) by 6× to 20× for verifiable inference, and by 4× to 11× for verifiable
and private inference. Finally, we discuss open challenges towards efficient verifiable training of DNNs in TEEs.
2 BACKGROUND
2.1 PROBLEM SETTING
We consider an outsourcing scheme between a client C and a server S , where S executes a DNN F (x) : X → Y
on data provided by C. The DNN can either belong to the user (e.g., as in some ML-as-a-service platforms), or to
the server (e.g., as in a cloud-based ML API). Depending on the application, this scheme should satisfy one or
more of the following security properties (see Appendix B for formal definitions):
• t-Integrity: For any S and input x, the probability that a user interacting with S does not abort (i.e., output
⊥) and outputs an incorrect value y˜ 6= F (x) is less than t.
• Privacy: The server S learns no information about the user’s input x.
• Model privacy: If the model F is provided by the user, S learns no information about F (beyond e.g., its
approximate size). If F belongs to the server, C learns no more about F than what is revealed by y = F (x).1
2.2 TRUSTED EXECUTION ENVIRONMENTS (TEES), INTEL SGX, AND A STRONG BASELINE
Trusted Execution Environments (TEE) such as Intel SGX, ARM TrustZone or Sanctum (Costan et al., 2016)
enable execution of programs in secure enclaves. Hardware protections isolate computations in enclaves from all
1For this zero-knowledge guarantee to be meaningful in our context, S would first commit to a specific DNN, and then
convince C that this DNN was correctly evaluated on her input, without revealing anything else about the DNN.
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Table 1: Security guarantees and performance (relative to baseline) of different ML outsourcing schemes.
Model Privacy
Approach TEE Integrity Privacy w.r.t. Server w.r.t. Client Throughput (relative)
SafetyNets (Ghodsi et al., 2017) -  # # # ≤ 1/200 ×
Gazelle (Juvekar et al., 2018) - #  * # G ≤ 1/1000 ×
Secure baseline (run DNN in TEE) 3     1×
Insecure baseline (run DNN on GPU) - # # # G ≥ 50×
Slalom (Ours) 3   * #  4× - 20×
* With an offline preprocessing phase.
programs on the same host, including the operating system. Enclaves can produce remote attestations—digital
signatures over an enclave’s code—that a remote party can verify using the manufacturer’s public key. Our
experiments with Slalom use hardware enclaves provided by Intel SGX (see Appendix A for details).2
TEEs offer an efficient solution for ML outsourcing: The server runs an enclave that initiates a secure communi-
cation with C and evaluates a model F on C’s input data. This simple scheme (which we implemented in SGX,
see Section 4) outperforms cryptographic ML outsourcing protocols by 2-3 orders of magnitude (albeit under a
different trust model). See Table 1 and Appendix C for a comparison to two representative works.
Yet, SGX’s security comes at a performance cost, and there remains a large gap between TEEs and untrusted
devices. For example, current SGX CPUs are limited to 128 MB of Processor Reserved Memory (PRM) (Costan
& Devadas, 2016) and incur severe paging overheads when exceeding this allowance (Orenbach et al., 2017).
We also failed to achieve noticeable speed ups for multi-threaded DNN evaluations in SGX enclaves (see
Appendix H). For DNN computations, current SGX enclaves thus cannot compete—in terms of performance or
energy efficiency (see Appendix C)—with contemporary untrusted hardware, such as a GPU or server CPU.
In this work, we treat the above simple (yet powerful) TEE scheme as a baseline, and identify settings where we
can still improve upon it. We will show that our system, Slalom, substantially outperforms this baseline when the
server has access to the model F (e.g., F belongs to S as in cloud ML APIs, or F is public). Slalom performs
best for verifiable inference (the setting considered in SafetyNets (Ghodsi et al., 2017)). If the TEE can run some
offline data-independent preprocessing (e.g., as in Gazelle (Juvekar et al., 2018)), Slalom also outperforms the
baseline for private (and verifiable) outsourced computations in a later online phase. Such a two-stage approach
is viable if user data is sent at irregular intervals yet has to be processed with high throughput when available.
2.3 OUTSOURCING OUTSOURCED DNNS AND FREIVALDS’ ALGORITHM
Our idea for speeding up DNN inference in TEEs is to further outsource work from the TEE to a co-located
faster untrusted processor. Improving upon the above baseline thus requires that the combined cost of doing
work on the untrusted device and verifying it in the TEE be cheaper than evaluating the full DNN in the TEE.
Wahby et al. (2016; 2017) aim at this goal for arbitrary computations outsourced between co-located ASICs. The
generic non-interactive proofs they use for integrity are similar to those used in SafetyNets (Ghodsi et al., 2017),
which incur overheads that are too large to warrant outsourcing in our setting (e.g., Wahby et al. (2016) find that
the technology gap between trusted and untrusted devices needs to be of over two decades for their scheme to
break even). Similarly for privacy, standard cryptographic outsourcing protocols (e.g., (Juvekar et al., 2018)) are
unusable in our setting as simply running the computation in the TEE is much more efficient (see Table 1).
2SGX has recently come under several side-channel attacks (Chen et al., 2018; Van Bulck et al., 2018). Intel is making
firmware and hardware updates to SGX with the goal of preventing these attacks. In time, it is likely that SGX can be made
sufficiently secure to satisfy the requirements needed for Slalom. Even if not, other enclave architectures are available, such
as Sanctum for RISC-V (Costan et al., 2016) or possibly a separate co-processor for security operations.
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To overcome this barrier, we design outsourcing protocols tailored to DNNs, leveraging two insights:
1. In our setting, the TEE is co-located with the server’s faster untrusted processors, thus widening the design
space to interactive outsourcing protocols with high communication but better efficiency.
2. The TEE always has knowledge of the model and can selectively outsource part of the DNN evaluation and
compute others—for which outsourcing is harder—itself.
DNNs are a class of functions that are particularly well suited for selective outsourcing. Indeed, non-linearities—
which are hard to securely outsource (with integrity or privacy)—represent a small fraction of the computation in
a DNN so we can evaluate these in the TEE (e.g., for VGG16 inference on a single CPU thread, about 1.5% of
the computation is spent on non-linearities). In contrast, linear operators—the main computational bottleneck in
DNNs—admit for a conceptually simple yet concretely efficient secure delegation scheme, described below.
Integrity. We verify integrity of outsourced linear layers using variants of an algorithm by Freivalds (1977).
Lemma 2.1 (Freivalds). Let A,B and C be n×n matrices over a field F and let s be a uniformly random vector
in Sn, for S ⊆ F. Then, Pr[Cs = A(Bs) | C 6= AB] = Pr[(C −AB)s = 0 | (C −AB) 6= 0] ≤ 1/|S| .
The randomized check requires 3n2 multiplications, a significant reduction (both in concrete terms and asymp-
totically) over evaluating the product directly. The algorithm has no false negatives and trivially extends to
rectangular matrices. Independently repeating the check k times yields soundness error 1/|S|k.
Privacy. Input privacy for outsourced linear operators could be achieved with linearly homomorphic encryption,
but the overhead (see the micro-benchmarks in (Juvekar et al., 2018)) is too high to compete with our baseline
(i.e., computing the function directly in the TEE would be faster than outsourcing it over encrypted data).
We instead propose a very efficient two-stage approach based on symmetric cryptography, i.e., an additive stream
cipher. Let f : Fm → Fn be a linear function over a field F. In an offline phase, the TEE generates a stream
of one-time-use pseudorandom elements r ∈ Fm, and pre-computes u = f(r). Then, in the online phase when
the remote client sends an input x, the TEE computes Enc(x) = x+ r over Fm (i.e., a secure encryption of x
with a stream cipher), and outsources the computation of f(Enc(x)) to the faster processor. Given the result
f(Enc(x)) = f(x+ r) = f(x) + f(r) = f(x) + u, the TEE recovers f(x) using the pre-computed u.
Communication. Using Freivalds’ algorithm and symmetric encryption for each linear layer in a DNN incurs
high interaction and communication between the TEE and untrusted co-processor (e.g., over 50MB per inference
for VGG16, see Table 3). This would be prohibitive if they were not co-located. There are protocols with lower
communication than repeatedly using Freivalds’ ((Fiore & Gennaro, 2012; Thaler, 2013; Ghodsi et al., 2017)).
Yet, these incur a high overhead on the prover in practice and are thus not suitable in our setting.
3 SLALOM
We introduce Slalom, a three-step approach for outsourcing DNNs from a TEE to an untrusted but faster device:
(1) Inputs and weights are quantized and embedded in a field F; (2) Linear layers are outsourced and verified
using Freivalds’ algorithm; (3) Inputs of linear layers are encrypted with a pre-computed pseudorandom stream to
guarantee privacy. Figure 1 shows two Slalom variants, one to achieve integrity, and one to also achieve privacy.
We focus on feed-forward networks with fully connected layers, convolutions, separable convolutions, pooling
layers and activations. Slalom can be extended to other architectures (e.g., residual networks, see Section 4.3).
4
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Slalom with integrity
TEE(F, x1) S(F )
x1−−→
for i ∈ [1, n] do
yi = xiWi
xi+1 = σ(yi)
y1...yn←−−−−−
for i ∈ [1, n] do
assert Freivalds(yi, xi,Wi)
xi+1 = σ(yi)
return yn
Slalom with integrity & privacy
TEE(F, x1) S(F )
Preproc : for i ∈ [1, n] do ri R←− Fmi , ui =riWi
for i ∈ [1, n] do
x˜i = xi + ri
x˜i−−→
y˜i←−− y˜i = x˜iWi
yi = y˜i − ui
assert Freivalds(yi, xi,Wi)
xi+1 = σ(yi)
return yn
Figure 1: The Slalom algorithms for verifiable and private DNN inference. The TEE outsources computation
of n linear layers of a model F to the untrusted host server S. Each linear layer is defined by a matrix Wi
of size mi × ni and followed by an activation σ. All operations are over a field F. The Freivalds(yi, xi, wi)
subroutine performs k repetitions of Freivalds’ check (possibly using precomputed values as in Section 3.2). The
pseudorandom elements ri (we omit the PRNG for simplicity) and precomputed values ui are used only once.
3.1 QUANTIZATION
The techniques we use for integrity and privacy (Freivalds’ algorithm and stream ciphers) work over a field F.
We thus quantize all inputs and weights of a DNN to integers, and embed these integers in the field Zp of integers
modulo a prime p (where p is larger than all values computed in a DNN evaluation, so as to avoid wrap-around).
As in (Gupta et al., 2015), we convert floating point numbers x to a fixed-point representation as x˜ = FP(x; l) :=
round(2l · x). For a linear layer with kernel W and bias b, we define integer parameters W˜ = FP(W, l), b˜ =
FP(b, 2l). After applying the layer to a quantized input x˜, we scale the output by 2−l and re-round to an integer.
For efficiency reasons, we perform integer arithmetic using floats (so-called fake quantization), and choose
p < 224 to avoid loss of precision (we use p = 224− 3). For the models we evaluate, setting l = 8 for all weights
and inputs ensures that all DNN values are bounded by 224, with less than a 0.5% drop in accuracy (see Table 3).
When performing arithmetic modulo p (e.g., for Freivalds’ algorithm or when computing on encrypted data), we
use double-precision floats, to reduce the number of modular reductions required (details are in Appendix F).
3.2 VERIFYING COMMON LINEAR OPERATORS
We now describe Slalom’s approach to verifying the integrity of outsourced linear layers. We describe these
layers in detail in Appendix D and summarize this section’s results in Table 2.
Freivalds’ Algorithm for Batches. The most direct way of applying Freivalds’ algorithm to arbitrary linear
layers of a DNN is by exploiting batching. Any linear layer f(x) from inputs of size m to outputs of size n can
be represented (with appropriate reshaping) as f(x) = x>W for a (often sparse and implicit) m× n matrix W .
For a batch X of size B, we can outsource f(X) and check that the output Y satisfies f(s>X) = s>Y , for a
random vector s (we are implicitly applying Freivalds to the matrix product XW = Y ). As the batch size B
grows, the cost of evaluating f is amortized and the total verification cost is |X|+ |Y |+ costf multiplications
(i.e., we approach one operation per input and output). Yet, as we show in Section 4.3, while batched verification
is worthwhile for processors with larger memory, it is prohibitive in SGX enclaves due to the limited PRM.
For full convolutions (and pointwise convolutions), a direct application of Freivalds’ check is worthwhile even for
single-element batches. For f(x) = Conv(x,W ) and purported output y, we can sample a random vector s of
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Table 2: Complexity (number of multiplications) for evaluating and verifying linear functions. The layers
are “Fully Connected”, ”Convolution”, ”Depthwise Convolution” and ”Pointwise Convolution”, defined in
Appendix D. Each layer f has an input x, output y and kernel W . We assume a batch size of B ≥ 1.
Layer |x|, |y| |W| costf (B = 1) Batched verification With preproc.
FC hin, hout hin · hout |x| · |y| B · (|x|+ |y|) + costf B · (|x|+ |y|)
Conv h · w · cin, h · w · cout k2 · cin · cout |x| · k2 · cout B · (|x|+ |y|) + cin · cout + |x| · k2 B · (|x|+ |y|)
Depth. Conv h · w · cin, h · w · cin k2 · cin |x| · k2 B · (|x|+ |y|) + costf B · (|x|+ |y|)
Point. Conv h · w · cin, h · w · cout cin · cout |x| · cout B · (|x|+ |y|) + cin · cout B · (|x|+ |y|)
dimension cout (the number of output channels), and check that Conv(x,Ws) = ys (with appropriate reshaping).
For a batch of inputs X , we can also apply Freivalds’ algorithm twice to reduce both W and X .
Preprocessing. We now show how to obtain an outsourcing scheme for linear layers that has optimal verification
complexity (i.e., |x|+ |y| operations) for single-element batches and arbitrary linear operators, while at the same
time compressing the DNN’s weights (a welcome property in our memory-limited TEE model).
We leverage two facts: (1) DNN weights are fixed at inference time, so part of Freivalds’ check can be pre-
computed; (2) the TEE can keep secrets from the host S , so the random values s can be re-used across layers or
inputs (if we run Freivalds’ check n times with the same secret randomness, the soundness errors grows at most
by a factor n). Our verification scheme with preprocessing follows from a reformulation of Lemma (2.1):
Lemma 3.1. Let f : Fm → Fn be a linear operator, f(x) := x>W . Let s be uniformly random in Sn, for
S ⊆ F, and let s˜ := ∇Fx(s) =Ws. For any x ∈ Fm, y ∈ Fn, we have Pr
[
y>s = x>s˜ | y 6= f(x)] ≤ 1/|S| .
The check requires |x|+ |y| multiplications, and storage for s and s˜ :=Ws (of size |x| and |y|). To save space,
we can reuse the same random s for every layer. The memory footprint of a model is then equal to the size of the
inputs of all its linear layers (e.g., for VGG16 the footprint is reduced from 550MB to 36MB, see Table 3).
3.3 INPUT PRIVACY
To guarantee privacy of the client’s inputs, we use precomputed blinding factors for each outsourced computation,
as described in Section 2.3. The TEE uses a cryptographic Pseudo Random Number Generator (PRNG) to
generate blinding factors. The precomputed “unblinding factors” are encrypted and stored in untrusted memory
or disk. In the online phase, the TEE regenerates the blinding factors using the same PRNG seed, and uses the
precomputed unblinding factors to decrypt the output of the outsourced linear layer.
This blinding process incurs several overheads: (1) the computations on the untrusted device have to be performed
over Zp so we use double-precision arithmetic. (2) The trusted and untrusted processors exchange data in-between
each layer, rather than at the end of a full inference pass. (3) The TEE has to efficiently load precomputed
unblinding factors, which requires either a large amount of RAM, or a fast access to disk (e.g., a PCIe SSD).
Slalom’s security is given by the following results. Formal definitions and proofs are in Appendix B. Let negl be
a negligible function (for any integer c > 0 there exists an integer Nc such that for all x > Nc, |negl(x)| < 1/xc).
Theorem 3.2. Let Slalom be the protocol from Figure 1 (right), where F is an n-layer DNN, and Freivalds’
algorithm is repeated k times per layer with random vectors drawn from S ⊆ F. Assume all random values are
generated using a secure PRNG with security parameter λ. Then, Slalom is a secure outsourcing scheme for F
between a TEE and an untrusted co-processor S with privacy and t-integrity for t = n/|S|k − negl(λ).
Corollary 3.3. Assuming the TEE is secure (i.e., it acts as a trusted third party hosted by S), Slalom is a secure
outsourcing scheme between a remote client C and server S with privacy and t-integrity for t = n/|S|k − negl(λ).
If the model F is the property of S, the scheme further satisfies model privacy.
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4 EMPIRICAL EVALUATION
We evaluate Slalom on real Intel SGX hardware, on micro-benchmarks and a sample application (ImageNet
inference with VGG16, MobileNet and ResNet models). Our aim is to show that, compared to a baseline that
runs inference fully in the TEE, outsourcing linear layers increases performance without sacrificing security.
4.1 IMPLEMENTATION
As enclaves cannot access most OS features (e.g., multi-threading, disk and driver IO), porting a large framework
such as TensorFlow or Intel’s MKL-DNN to SGX is hard. Instead, we designed a lightweight C++ library for
feed-forward networks based on Eigen, a linear-algebra library which TensorFlow uses as a CPU backend. Our
library implements the forward pass of DNNs, with support for dense layers, standard and separable convolutions,
pooling, and activations. When run on a native CPU (without SGX), its performance is comparable to TensorFlow
on CPU (compiled with AVX). Our code is available at https://github.com/ftramer/slalom.
Slalom performs arithmetic over Zp, for p = 224 − 3. For integrity, we apply Freivalds’ check twice to each
layer (k = 2), with random values from S = [−219, 219], to achieve 40 bits of statistical soundness per layer (see
Appendix F for details on the selection of these parameters). For a 50-layer DNN, S has a chance of less than 1
in 22 billion of fooling the TEE on any incorrect DNN evaluation (a slightly better guarantee than in SafetyNets).
For privacy, we use AES-CTR and AES-GCM to generate, encrypt and authenticate blinding factors.
4.2 SETUP
We use an Intel Core i7-6700 Skylake 3.40GHz processor with 8GB of RAM, a desktop processor with SGX
support. The outsourced computations are performed on a co-located Nvidia TITAN XP GPU. Due to a lack
of native internal multi-threading in SGX, we run our TEE in a single CPU thread. We discuss challenges for
efficient parallelization in Appendix H. We evaluate Slalom on the following workloads:
• Synthetic benchmarks for matrix products, convolutions and separable convolutions, where we compare the
enclave’s running time for computing a linear operation to that of solely verifying the result.
• ImageNet (Deng et al., 2009) classification with VGG16 (Simonyan & Zisserman, 2014), MobileNet (Howard
et al., 2017), and ResNet He et al. (2016) models (with fused Batch Normalization layers when applicable).
MobileNet, a model tailored for low compute devices, serves as a worst-case benchmark for Slalom, as the
model’s design aggressively minimizes the amount of computation performed per layer. We also consider a
“fused” variant of MobileNet with no activation between depthwise and pointwise convolutions. Removing
these activations improves convergence and accuracy (Chollet, 2017; Sheng et al., 2018), while also making the
network more outsourcing-friendly (i.e., it is possible to verify a separable convolution in a single step).
Our evaluation focuses on throughput (number of forward passes per second). We also discuss energy efficiency
in Appendix C to account for hardware differences between our baseline (TEE only) and Slalom (TEE + GPU).
4.3 RESULTS
Micro-Benchmarks. Our micro-benchmark suite consists of square matrix products of increasing dimensions,
convolutional operations performed by VGG16, and separable convolutions performed by MobileNet. In all
cases, the data is pre-loaded inside an enclave, so we only measure the in-enclave execution time. Figure 2 plots
the relative speedups of various verification strategies over the cost of computing the linear operation directly. In
all cases, the baseline computation is performed in single-precision floating point, and the verification algorithms
repeat Freivalds’ check so as to attain at least 40 bits of statistical soundness.
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Figure 2: Micro benchmarks on Intel SGX. We plot the relative speedup of verifying the result of a linear
operator compared to computing it entirely in the enclave. The dotted line shows the throughput obtained for a
direct computation. “Fused” separable convolutions contain no intermediate activation.
For square matrices of dimensions up to 2048, verifying an outsourced result is 4× to 8× faster than computing
it. For larger matrices, we exceed the limit of SGX’s DRAM, so the enclave resorts to expensive paging which
drastically reduces performance both for computation and verification.
For convolutions (standard or separable), we achieve large savings with outsourcing if Freivalds’ algorithm is
applied with preprocessing. The savings get higher as the number of channels increases. Without preprocessing,
Freivalds’ algorithm results in savings when cout is large. Due to SGX’s small PRM, batched verification is
only effective for operators with small memory footprints. As expected, “truly” separable convolutions (with no
intermediate non-linearity) are much faster to verify, as they can be viewed as a single linear operator.
Verifiable Inference. Figure 3 shows the throughout of end-to-end forward passes in two neural networks,
VGG16 and MobileNet. For integrity, we compare the secure baseline (executing the DNN fully in the enclave) to
two variants of the Slalom algorithm in Figure 1. The first (in red) applies Freivalds’ algorithm “on-the-fly”, while
the second more efficient variant (in orange) pre-computes part of Freivalds’ check as described in Section 3.2.
The VGG16 network is much larger (500MB) than SGX’s PRM. As a result, there is a large overhead on the
forward pass and verification without preprocessing. If the enclave securely stores preprocessed products Wr
for all network weights, we drastically reduce the memory footprint and achieve up to a 20.3× increase in
throughput. We also ran the lower-half of the VGG16 network (without the fully connected layers), a common
approach for extracting features for transfer learning or object recognition (Liu et al., 2016). This part fits in the
PRM, and we thus achieve higher throughput for in-enclave forward passes and on-the-fly verification.
For MobileNet, we achieve between 3.6× and 6.4× speedups when using Slalom for verifiable inference (for the
standard or “fused” model, respectively). The speedups are smaller than for VGG16, as MobileNet performs
much fewer operations per layer (verifying a linear layer requires computing at least two multiplications for each
input and output. The closer the forward pass gets to that lower-bound, the less we can save by outsourcing).
Private Inference. We further benchmark the cost of private DNN inference, where inputs of outsourced
linear layers are additionally blinded. Blinding and unblinding each layer’s inputs and outputs is costly,
especially in SGX due to the extra in-enclave memory reads and writes. Nevertheless, for VGG16 and the fused
MobileNet variant without intermediate activations, we achieve respective speedups of 13.0× and 5.0× for
private outsourcing (in black in Figure 3), and speedups of 10.7× and 4.1× when also ensuring integrity (in
purple). For this benchmark, the precomputed unblinding factor are stored in untrusted memory.
We performed the same experiments on a standard CPU (i.e., without SGX) and find that Slalom’s improvements
are even higher in non-resource-constrained or multi-threaded environments (see Appendix G-H). Slalom’s
improvements over the baseline also hold when accounting for energy efficiency (see Section C).
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Figure 3: Verifiable and private inference with Intel SGX. We show results for VGG16, VGG16 without the
fully connected layers, MobileNet, and a fused MobileNet variant with no intermediate activation for separable
convolutions. We compare the baseline of fully executing the DNN in the enclave (blue) to different secure
outsourcing schemes: integrity with Freivalds (red); integrity with Freivalds and precomputed secrets (yellow);
privacy only (black); privacy and integrity (purple).
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Figure 4: Secure outsourcing of ResNet models with Intel SGX. We compare the baseline of fully executing
the DNN in the enclave (blue) to secure outsourcing with integrity (yellow) and privacy and integrity (purple).
Extending Slalom to Deep Residual Networks. The Slalom algorithm in Figure 1 and our evaluations above
focus on feed-forward architectures. Extending Slalom to more complex DNNs is quite simple. To illustrate, we
consider the family of ResNet models (He et al., 2016), which use residual blocks f(x) = σ(f1(x) + f2(x)) that
merge two feed-forward “paths” f1 and f2 into a final activation σ. To verify integrity of f(x), the TEE simply
verifies all linear layers in f1 and f2 and computes σ directly. For privacy, the TEE applies the interactive Slalom
protocol in Figure 1 (right) in turn to f1 and f2, and then computes σ. The results for the privacy-preserving
Slalom variant in Figure 4 use a preliminary implementation that performs all required operations—and thus
provides meaningful performance numbers—but without properly constructed unblinding factors.
We use the ResNet implementation from Keras Chollet et al. (2015), which contains a pre-trained 50-layer
variant. For this model, we find that our quantization scheme results in less than a 0.5% decrease in accuracy (see
Table 3). For other variants (i.e., with 18, 34, 101 and 152 layers) we compute throughput on untrained models.
Figure 4 shows benchmarks for different ResNet variants when executed fully in the enclave (our baseline) as
well as secure outsourcing with integrity or privacy and integrity. For all models, we achieve 6.6× to 14.4×
speedups for verifiable inference and 4.4× to 9.0× speedups when adding privacy.
Comparing results for different models is illustrative of how Slalom’s savings scale with model size and
architectural design choices. The 18 and 34-layer ResNets use convolutions with 3 × 3 kernels, whereas the
larger models mainly use pointwise convolutions. As shown in Table 2 verifying a convolution is about a factor
k2 · cout than computing it, which explains the higher savings for models that use convolutions with large kernel
windows. When adding more layers to a model, we expect Slalom’s speedup over the baseline to remain constant
(e.g., if we duplicate each layer, the baseline computation and the verification should both take twice as long). Yet
we find that Slalom’s speedups usually increase as layers get added to the ResNet architecture. This is because
the deeper ResNet variants are obtained by duplicating layers towards the end of the pipeline, which have the
largest number of channels and for which Slalom achieves the highest savings.
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5 CHALLENGES FOR VERIFIABLE AND PRIVATE TRAINING
Our techniques for secure outsourcing of DNN inference might also apply to DNN training. Indeed, a backward
pass consists of similar linear operators as a forward pass, and can thus be verified with Freivalds’ algorithm. Yet,
applying Slalom to DNN training is challenging, as described below, and we leave this problem open.
• Quantizing DNNs for training is harder than for inference, due to large changes in weight magnitudes (Mi-
cikevicius et al., 2018). Thus, a more flexible quantization scheme than the one we used would be necessary.
• Because the DNN’s weights change during training, the same preprocessed random vectors for Freivalds’
check cannot be re-used indefinitely. The most efficient approach would presumably be to train with very
large batches than can then be verified simultaneously.
• Finally, the pre-computation techniques we employ for protecting input privacy do not apply for training, as
the weights change after every processed batch. Moreover, Slalom does not try to hide the model weights
from the untrusted processor, which might be a requirement for private training.
6 CONCLUSION
This paper has studied the efficiency of evaluating a DNN in a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) to provide
strong integrity and privacy guarantees. We explored new approaches for segmenting a DNN evaluation to
securely outsource work from a trusted environment to a faster co-located but untrusted processor.
We designed Slalom, a framework for efficient DNN evaluation that outsources all linear layers from a TEE
to a GPU. Slalom leverage Freivalds’ algorithm for verifying correctness of linear operators, and additionally
encrypts inputs with precomputed blinding factors to preserve privacy. Slalom can work with any TEE and we
evaluated its performance using Intel SGX on various workloads. For canonical DNNs (VGG16, MobileNet and
ResNet variants), we have shown that Slalom boosts inference throughput without compromising security.
Securely outsourcing matrix products from a TEE has applications in ML beyond DNNs (e.g., non negative
matrix factorization, dimensionality reduction, etc.) We have also explored avenues and challenges towards
applying similar techniques to DNN training, an interesting direction for future work. Finally, our general
approach of outsourcing work from a TEE to a faster co-processor could be applied to other problems which
have fast verification algorithms, e.g., those considered in (McConnell et al., 2011; Zhang et al., 2014).
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A DETAILS ON INTEL SGX SECURITY
SGX enclaves isolate execution of a program from all other processes on a same host, including a potentially
malicious OS. In particular, enclave memory is fully encrypted and authenticated. When a word is read from
memory into a CPU register, a Memory Management Engine handles the decryption (Costan & Devadas, 2016).
While SGX covers many software and hardware attack vectors, there is a large and prominent class of side-
channel attacks that it explicitly does not address (Costan & Devadas, 2016; Tramèr et al., 2017). In the past
years, many attacks have been proposed, with the goal of undermining privacy of enclave computations (Xu
et al., 2015; Brasser et al., 2017; Moghimi et al., 2017; Götzfried et al., 2017; Van Bulck et al., 2017; Lee et al.,
2017). Most of these attacks rely on data dependent code behavior in an enclave (e.g., branching or memory
access) that can be partially observed by other processes running on the same host. These side-channels are a
minor concern for the DNN computations considered in this paper, as the standard computations in a DNN are
data-oblivious (i.e., the same operations are applied regardless of the input data) (Ohrimenko et al., 2016).
The recent Spectre attacks on speculative execution (Kocher et al., 2018) also prove damaging to SGX (as well
as to most other processors), as recently shown (Chen et al., 2018; Dall et al., 2018; Van Bulck et al., 2018).
Mitigations for these side-channel attacks are being developed (Shinde et al., 2016; Shih et al., 2017; Chen et al.,
2017; Intel Corp., 2018) but a truly secure solution might require some architectural changes, e.g., as in the
proposed Sanctum processor (Costan et al., 2016).
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We refrain from formally modeling SGX’s (or other TEE’s) security in this paper, as Slalom is mostly concerned
with outsourcing protocols wherein the TEE acts as a client. We refer the interested reader to (Pass et al., 2017;
Fisch et al., 2017; Subramanyan et al., 2017) for different attempts at such formalisms.
B FORMAL SECURITY DEFINITIONS AND PROOFS
We define a secure outsourcing scheme, between a client C and a server S , for a DNN F (x) : X → Y from some
family F (e.g., all DNNs of a given size). We first assume that the model F is known to both C and S:
Definition B.1 (Secure Outsourcing Schemes). A secure outsourcing scheme consists of an offline preprocessing
algorithm Preproc, as well as an interactive online protocol Outsource〈C,S〉, defined as follows:
• st← Preproc(F, 1λ): The preprocessing algorithm is run by C and generates some data-independent state
st (e.g., cryptographic keys or precomputed values to accelerate the online outsourcing protocol.)
• Y ∪ {⊥} ← Outsource〈C(F, x,st),S(F )〉: The online outsourcing protocol is initiated by C with inputs
(F, x,st). At the end of the protocol, C either outputs a value y ∈ Y or aborts (i.e., C outputs ⊥).
The properties that we may require from a secure outsourcing scheme are:
• Correctness: For any F ∈ F and x ∈ X , running st ← Preproc(F, 1λ) and y ←
Outsource〈C(F, x,st),S(F )〉 yields y = F (x).
• t-Integrity: For any F ∈ F , input x ∈ X and probabilistic polynomial-time adversary S∗, the probability
that y˜ = Outsource〈C(F, x,st),S∗(F )〉 and y˜ /∈ {F (x),⊥} is less than t.
• Input privacy: For any F ∈ F , inputs x, x′ ∈ X and probabilistic poly-time adversary S∗, the views of S∗ in
Outsource〈C(F, x,st),S∗(F )〉 and Outsource〈C(F, x′,st),S∗(F )〉 are computationally indistinguishable.
• Efficiency: The online computation of C in Outsource should be less than the cost for C to evaluate F ∈ F .
Model Privacy. In some applications a secure outsourcing scheme may also require to hide the model F from
either S or C (in which case that party would obviously not take F as input in the above scheme).
Privacy with respect to an adversarial server S∗ (which Slalom does not provide), is defined as the indistinguisha-
bility of S∗’s views in Outsource〈C(F, x,st),S∗〉 and Outsource〈C(F ′, x,st),S∗〉 for any F, F ′ ∈ F .
As noted in Section 2.1, a meaningful model-privacy guarantee with respect to C requires that S first commit
to a specific DNN F , and then convinces C that her outputs were produced with the same model as all other
clients’. We refer the reader to Canetti et al. (2002) for formal definitions for such commit-and-prove schemes,
and to Tramèr et al. (2017) who show how to trivially instantiate them using a TEE.
Proof of Theorem 3.2. Let st ← Preproc and Outsource〈TEE(F, x,st),S〉 be the outsourcing scheme
defined in Figure 1 (right). We assume that all random values sampled by the TEE are produced by a secure
cryptographically secure pseudorandom number generator (PRNG) (with elements in S ⊆ F for the integrity-
check vectors s used in Freivalds’ algorithm, and in F for the blinding vectors ri).
We first consider integrity. Assume that the scheme is run with input x1 and that the TEE outputs yn. We will
bound Pr[yn 6= F (x1) | yn 6= ⊥]. By the security of the PRNG, we can replace the vectors s used in Freivalds’
algorithm by truly uniformly random values in S ⊆ F, via a simple hybrid argument. For the i-th linear layer,
with operator Wi, input xi and purported output yi, we then have that yi 6= xiWi with probability at most 1/|S|k.
By a simple union bound, we thus have that Pr[yn 6= F (x1)] ≤ n/|S|k − negl(λ). Note that this bound holds
even if the same (secret) random values s are re-used across layers.
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For privacy, consider the views of an adversary S∗ when Slalom is run with inputs x1 and x′1. Again, by the
security of the PRNG, we consider a hybrid protocol where we replace the pre-computed blinding vectors ri by
truly uniformly random values in F. In this hybrid protocol, x˜i = xi + ri is simply a “one-time-pad” encryption
of xi over the field F, so S∗’s views in both executions of the hybrid protocol are equal (information theoretically).
Thus, S∗’s views in both executions of the original protocol are computationally indistinguishable.
Proof of Corollary 3.3. The outsourcing protocol between the remote client C and server S hosting the TEE is
simply defined as follows (we assume the model belongs to S):
• st ← Preproc(): C and the TEE setup a secure authenticated communication channel, using the TEE’s
remote attestation property. The TEE receives the model F from S and initializes the Slalom protocol.
• Outsource〈C(x,st),S(F )〉:
– C sends x to the TEE over the secure channel.
– The TEE securely computes y = F (x) using Slalom.
– The TEE sends y (and a publicly verifiable commitment to F ) to C over the secure channel.
If the TEE is secure (i.e., it acts as a trusted third party hosted by S), then the result follows.
C PERFORMANCE COMPARISON OF DNN OUTSOURCING SCHEMES
We provide a brief overview of the outsourcing approaches compared in Table 1. Our baseline runs a DNN in a
TEE (a single-threaded Intel SGX enclave) and can provide all the security guarantees of an ML outsourcing
scheme. On a high-end GPU (an Nvidia TITAN XP), we achieve over 50× higher throughput but no security.
For example, for MobileNet, the enclave evaluates 16 images/sec and the GPU 900 images/sec (56× higher).
SafetyNets (Ghodsi et al., 2017) and Gazelle (Juvekar et al., 2018) are two representative works that achieve
respectively integrity and privacy using purely cryptographic approaches (without a TEE). SafetyNets does not
hide the model from either party, while Gazelle leaks some architectural details to the client. The cryptographic
techniques used by these systems incur large computation and communication overheads in practice. The largest
model evaluated by SafetyNets is a 4-layer TIMIT model with quadratic activations which runs at about 13
images/sec (on a notebook CPU). In our baseline enclave, the same model runs at over 3,500 images/sec. The
largest model evaluated by Gazelle is an 8-layer CIFAR10 model. In the enclave, we can evaluate 450 images/sec
whereas Gazelle evaluates a single image in 3.5 sec with 300MB of communication between client and server.
A Note on Energy Efficiency. When comparing approaches with different hardware (e.g., our single-core CPU
baseline versus Slalom which also uses a GPU), throughput alone is not the fairest metric. E.g., the baseline’s
throughput could also be increased by adding more SGX CPUs. A more accurate comparison considers the
energy efficiency of a particular approach, a more direct measure of the recurrent costs to the server S.
For example, when evaluating MobileNet or VGG16, our GPU draws 85W of power, whereas our baseline SGX
CPU draws 30W. As noted above, the GPU also achieves more than 50× higher throughput, and thus is at least
18× more energy efficient (e.g., measured in Joules per image) than the enclave.
For Slalom, we must consider the cost of running both the enclave and GPU. In our evaluations, the outsourced
computations on the GPU account for at most 10% of the total running time of Slalom (i.e., the integrity checks
and data encryption/decryption in the enclave are the main bottleneck). Thus, the power consumption attributed
to Slalom is roughly 10% · 85W+90% · 30W = 35.5W. Note that when not being in use by Slalom, the trusted
CPU or untrusted GPU can be used by other tasks running on the server. As Slalom achieves 4×-20× higher
throughput than our baseline for the tasks we evaluate, it is also about 3.4×-17.1× more energy efficient.
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D NOTATION FOR STANDARD LINEAR OPERATORS
Below we describe some common linear operators used in deep neural networks. For simplicity, we omit additive
bias terms, and assume that convolutional operators preserve the spatial height and width of their inputs. Our
techniques easily extend to convolutions with arbitrary strides, paddings, and window sizes.
For a fully-connected layer fFC, the kernel W has dimension (hin × hout). For an input x of dimension hin, we
have fFC(x) = x>W . The cost of the layer is hin · hout multiplications.
A convolutional layer has kernel W of size (k × k × cin × cout). On input x of size (h× w × cin), fconv(x) =
Conv(x;W ) produces an output of size (h × w × cout). A convolution can be seen as the combination of
two linear operators: a “patch-extraction” process that transforms the input x into an intermediate input x′ of
dimension (h · w, k2 · cin) by extracting k × k patches, followed by a matrix multiplication with W . The cost of
this layer is thus k2 · h · w · cin · cout multiplications.
A separable convolution has two kernels, W1 of size (k × k × cin) and W2 of size (cin × cout). On input x of
size (h× w × cin), fsep-conv(x) produces an output of size (h× w × cout), by applying a depthwise convolution
fdp-conv(x) with kernel W1 followed by a pointwise convolution fpt-conv(x) with kernel W2. The depthwise
convolution consists of cin independent convolutions with filters of size k × k × 1× 1, applied to a single input
channel, which requires k2 · h · w · cin multiplications. A pointwise convolution is simply a matrix product with
an input of size (h · w)× cin, and thus requires h · w · cin · cout multiplications.
E NEURAL NETWORK DETAILS
Table 3 provides details about the two DNNs we use in our evaluation (all pre-trained models are taken from
Keras Chollet et al. (2015)). We report top 1 and top 5 accuracy on ImageNet with and without the simple
quantization scheme described in Section 3.1. Quantization results in at most a 0.5% drop in top 1 and top
5 accuracy. More elaborate quantization schemes exist (e.g., Micikevicius et al. (2018)) that we have not
experimented with in this work.
We report the number of model parameters, which is relevant to the memory constraints of TEEs such as Intel
SGX. We also list the total size of the inputs and outputs of all the model’s linear layers, which impact the amount
of communication between trusted and untrusted co-processors in Slalom, as well as the amount of data stored in
the TEE when using Freivalds’ algorithm with preprocessing.
Table 3: Details of models used in our evaluation. Accuracies are computed on the ImageNet validation set.
Pre-trained models are from Keras Chollet et al. (2015).
Accuracy Quantized
Model Top 1 Top 5 Top 1 Top 5 Layers Parameters (M) Size of layer inputs/outputs (M)
VGG16 71.0 90.0 70.6 89.5 16 138.4 9.1 / 13.6
VGG16 (no top) - - - - 13 14.7 9.1 / 13.5
MobileNet 70.7 89.6 70.5 89.5 28 4.2 5.5 / 5.0
MobileNet (fused) - - - - 15 4.2 3.6 / 3.1
ResNet 50 76.9 92.4 76.4 92.2 50 25.5 10.0 / 10.4
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F MODULAR ARITHMETIC WITH FLOATING POINT OPERATIONS
In this section, we briefly describe how Slalom performs modular arithmetic over a field Zp in the TEE, while
leveraging standard floating point operations to maximize computational efficiency. The main computations in
the TEE are inner products over Zp for Freivalds’ check (a matrix product is itself a set of inner products).
Our quantization scheme (see Section 3.1) ensures that all DNN values can be represented in Zp, for p / 224,
which fits in a standard float. To compute inner products, we first cast elements to doubles (as a single
multiplication in Zp would exceed the range of integers exactly representable as floats). Single or double
precision floats are preferable to integer types on Intel architectures due to the availability of much more efficient
SIMD instructions, at a minor reduction in the range of exactly representable integers.
In our evaluation, we target a soundness error of 2−40 for each layer. This leads to a tradeoff between the number
of repetitions k of Freivalds’ check, and the size of the set S from which we draw random values. One check
with |S| = 240 is problematic, as multiplying elements in Zp and S can exceed the range of integers exactly
representable as doubles (253). With k = 2 repetitions, we can set S = [−219, 219]. Multiplications are then
bounded by 224+19 = 243, and we can accumulate 210 terms in the inner-product before needing a modular
reduction. In practice, we find that increasing k further (and thus reducing |S|) is not worthwhile, as the cost of
performing more inner products trumps the savings from reducing the number of modulos.
G RESULTS ON A STANDARD CPU
For completeness, and to asses how our outsourcing scheme fairs in an environment devoid of Intel SGX’s
performance quirks, we rerun the evaluations in Section 4 on the same CPU but outside of SGX’s enclave mode.
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Figure 5: Micro benchmarks on an untrusted CPU. For three different linear operators, we plot the relative
speedup of verifying a result compared to computing it. The dotted line in each plot shows the throughput
obtained for computing the operation.
Figure 5 show the results of the micro-benchmarks for matrix multiplication, convolution and separable convolu-
tions. In all cases, verifying a computation becomes 1-2 orders of magnitude faster than computing it as the outer
dimension grows. Compared to the SGX benchmarks, we also see a much better viability of batched verification
(we haven’t optimized batched verifications much, as they are inherently slow on SGX. It is likely that these
numbers could be improved significantly, to approach those of verification with preprocessing).
Figure 6 shows benchmarks for VGG16 and MobileNet on a single core with either direct computation or various
secure outsourcing strategies. For integrity alone, we achieve savings up to 8.9× and 19.5× for MobileNet and
VGG16 respectively. Even without storing any secrets in the enclave, we obtain good speedups using batched
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Figure 6: Inference with integrity and/or privacy on an untrusted CPU. We compare the baseline inference
throughput (blue) to that obtained with “on-the-fly” integrity checks (red); batched integrity checks (green);
integrity checks with precomputed secrets (yellow); privacy only (black); and privacy and integrity (purple). The
fused MobileNet model has no intermediate activation for separable convolutions.
verification. As noted above, it is likely that the batched results could be further improved. With additional
blinding to preserve privacy, we achieve speedups of 3.9× and 8.1× for MobileNet and VGG16 respectively.
H PARALLELIZATION
Our experiments on SGX in Section 4 where performed using a single execution thread, as SGX enclaves do not
have the ability to create threads. We have also experimented with techniques for achieving parallelism in SGX,
both for standard computations and outsourced ones, but with little success.
To optimize for throughput, a simple approach is to run multiple forward passes simultaneously. On a standard
CPU, this form of “outer-parallelism” achieves close to linear scaling as we increase the number of threads from
1 to 4 on our quad-core machine. With SGX however, we did not manage to achieve any parallel speedup for
VGG16—whether for direct computation or verifying outsourced results—presumably because each independent
thread requires extra memory that quickly exceeds the PRM limit. For the smaller MobileNet model, we get less
than a 1.5× speedup using up to 4 threads, for direct computation or outsourced verification alike.
DNNs typically also make use of intra-operation parallelism, i.e., computing the output of a given layer using
multiple threads. Our DNN library currently does not support intra-operation parallelism, but implementing
a dedicated thread pool for SGX could be an interesting extension for future work. Instead, we evaluate the
potential benefits of intra-op parallelism on a standard untrusted CPU, for our matrix-product and convolution
benchmarks. We make use of Eigen’s internal multi-threading support to speed up these operations, and custom
OpenMP code to parallelize dot products, as Eigen does not do this on its own.
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Figure 7: Multi-threaded micro benchmarks on an untrusted CPU. Reiterates benchmarks for matrix prod-
ucts and convolutions using 4 threads.
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Figure 7 shows the results using 4 threads. For convolutions, we have currently only implemented multi-threading
for the verification with preprocessing (which requires only standard dot products). Surprisingly maybe, we find
that multi-threading increases the gap between direct and verified computations of matrix products, probably
because dot products are extremely easy to parallelize efficiently (compared to full convolutions). We also obtain
close to linear speedups for verifiable separable convolutions, but omit the results as we currently do not have an
implementation of multi-threaded direct computation for depthwise convolutions, which renders the comparison
unfair. Due to the various memory-access overheads in SGX, it is unclear whether similar speedups could be
obtained by using intra-op parallelism in an enclave, but this is an avenue worth exploring.
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